In this paper, we examine the effect of voluntary adoption of clawback provision on non-GAAP earnings disclosures. The extant literature documents that the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions improves financial reporting quality by increasing the costs of misstating GAAP earnings. However, managers may respond to perception of reduced discretion over GAAP reporting by increasing their reliance on non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Using propensity score matching and a difference-in-differences research design, we document that managers disclose non-GAAP earnings more frequently after clawback adoption, but the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions declines. These findings are consistent with a more opportunistic use of non-GAAP reporting following clawback adoption. We confirm our findings with additional cross-sectional tests related to constraints on GAAP earnings management and managerial meeting-orbeating behavior. Our results suggest that managers adapt to the more restrictive reporting environment created through clawback adoption by increasing their opportunistic use of non-GAAP reporting. To our knowledge, this is the first documented evidence of any costs associated with clawback adoptions. These findings may have implications related to the mandatory adoption of clawbacks required under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.
Introduction
This paper examines the effect of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on firms'
non-GAAP earnings disclosure practices. Firms adopt clawbacks to recover executive compensation based on financial performance that is subsequently invalidated, most typically through an earnings restatement. Clawbacks are intended to discourage intentional misstatement of accounting information by imposing an ex post penalty on managers, and recent studies document that financial reporting quality improves after their voluntary adoption (see, e.g., Chan, Chen, Chen, and Yu, 2012; deHaan, Hodge, and Shevlin, 2013) . This evidence suggests that adopting clawback provisions increases the costs associated with misstating earnings defined under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, it is possible that managers adapt to this more restrictive reporting environment by disclosing financial performance measures that would not be subject to restatement, such as non-GAAP earnings. We therefore examine whether the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions affects the frequency and quality of firms' non-GAAP earnings disclosures.
Non-GAAP (or "pro forma") earnings disclosures are alternative earnings performance measures provided by individual firms that attempt to measure "core" earnings form reported GAAP earnings. Prior research finds that non-GAAP earnings figures are, on average, more value relevant than GAAP earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Larson 2003) , but there is also evidence that these disclosures are used opportunistically by managers. For example, Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman (2003) report that items excluded from non-GAAP earnings are predictive of future performance, which suggests that these expenses are recurring and opportunistically excluded from core or permanent earnings. In addition, managers appear to use non-GAAP earnings disclosures to meet earnings benchmarks (Lougee and Marquardt 2004; Black and Christensen 2009 ).
While prior research shows that clawback provisions improve GAAP earnings quality, it is unclear how voluntarily adopting these provisions might affect the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that the likelihood of non-GAAP disclosure is inversely related to GAAP earnings quality, which suggests that the frequency of non-GAAP disclosures will decrease as GAAP earnings quality improves following voluntary clawback adoption. Alternatively, clawbacks serve as an ex ante deterrent of GAAP violations by increasing managers' costs of manipulating GAAP earnings for their personal benefit.
Managers may compensate for this perceived reduction in GAAP reporting discretion by voluntarily releasing non-GAAP earnings measures to investors, which suggests that voluntary clawback adoption will increase the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure.
The effect of clawback adoption on the quality of non-GAAP earnings is similarly ambiguous. On the one hand, Frankel, McVay, and Soliman (2011) find that better corporate governance is associated with higher quality non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Since clawbacks are generally viewed as improving governance practices, one might expect an improvement in the quality of non-GAAP reporting following their adoption. On the other hand, managers may respond to the increased costs of GAAP earnings misstatements by using non-GAAP earnings more aggressively since these performance measures are not subject to clawback provisions. 1 1 Palmrose and Scholz (2004) examine the association between the restatements of non-GAAP reporting and legal consequences, providing evidence that core and pervasive restatements increase the probability of lawsuits. They define core earnings as non-GAAP earnings, which is different from the definition we use in this paper. In this paper, non-GAAP earnings (pro forma earnings) refers to an earnings metric a firm calculates by excluding or including certain items from GAAP earnings. Implicit in this is the assumption that non-GAAP earnings, as defined in this paper, are not subject to restatements. Therefore, manipulating non-GAAP earnings by excluding certain expenses would not be subject to clawback provisions.
The quality of non-GAAP earnings may consequently decrease following a voluntary adoption of clawback provisions.
To examine these effects, we estimate a probit model of the likelihood of non-GAAP earnings disclosure before and after voluntary clawback adoption using two different samples:
(1) a sample consisting of only clawback adopters and (2) a sample where clawback adopters are matched with non-adopters based on a propensity score matched sample (1:1 matching). The propensity-score matching procedure mitigates concerns over omitted variables that are correlated with both clawback adoption and non-GAAP reporting decisions. In addition,
propensity-score matching allows us to use a difference-in-differences research design to analyze changes in non-GAAP reporting before and after clawback adoption. After controlling for other determinants of non-GAAP earnings disclosure, we find that firms are significantly more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings after they voluntarily adopt clawback provisions.
To investigate whether the increase in non-GAAP reporting frequency is motivated by a desire to better inform investors or to mislead investors, we examine the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions. Following Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman (2003) and Kolev, Marquardt, and McVay (2008) , a higher quality exclusion is defined as being more transitory and having no predictive power for future operating income. We find that there has been a significant decrease in the quality of non-GAAP exclusions after a firm voluntarily adopts clawback provisions; i.e., future operating income is more negatively correlated with non-GAAP exclusions after adopting clawback provisions. An increase in non-GAAP reporting frequency combined with a decrease in non-GAAP exclusion quality is consistent with greater opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings disclosures after initiation of voluntary clawback provisions, an outcome contrary to the intended objective of clawback adoption. This suggests that an increase in the cost of manipulating GAAP earnings relative to non-GAAP earnings can cause opportunisticallymotivated managers to shift their focus from GAAP to non-GAAP earnings.
We confirm this interpretation by performing two additional cross-sectional analyses. If voluntary clawback adoption results in an increase in the opportunistic use of non-GAAP disclosure, these effects should be relatively more pronounced for firms with greater incentives for opportunistic reporting. We proxy for these incentives by determining whether the firm has an unusually high level of net operating assets (NOA) on its balance sheet and whether the firm has failed to meet or beat analyst forecasts of earnings, as Doyle et al. (2013) find that managers are more likely to use non-GAAP earnings opportunistically in both of these situations. We find that the deterioration in the quality of non-GAAP exclusions following voluntary clawback adoption is significantly greater when existing NOA is high and when firms miss analyst forecasts, consistent with an increase in the opportunistic use of non-GAAP reporting.
These results contribute to existing literature in several ways. First, the study contributes to the growing literature on the consequences of clawback adoption. Prior research has documented significant benefits associated with clawback adoption. For example, Chan, Chen, Chen, and Yu (2012) find a reduction in the frequency of accounting restatements and higher earnings response coefficients after voluntary clawback adoption, and deHaan, Hodge, and Shevlin (2012) report reductions in firms' benchmark beating behavior and the dispersion of analyst forecasts. In addition, Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) find that clawback adoption enhances firm value for firms with a history of prior restatements, suggesting that investors view clawbacks as a credible corporate governance mechanism. In contrast, we document an increase in the frequency and a decrease in the quality of non-GAAP earnings, consistent with an increase in the opportunistic use of non-GAAP disclosure following clawback adoption. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence related to any costs associated with voluntary adoption of clawbacks.
Our findings also extend the literature on non-GAAP reporting by providing new evidence that managers use GAAP and non-GAAP earnings as substitutes to achieve their financial reporting objectives. For example, Doyle et al. (2013) find that managers are more likely to shift to non-GAAP earnings to meet analyst forecasts when the cost of within-GAAP earnings management is high, as indicated by high levels of existing income-increasing accruals on the balance sheet (Barton and Simko 2002) . Similarly, our results indicate that when clawbacks increase the cost of within-GAAP earnings management, managers are more likely to opportunistically disclose non-GAAP earnings figures. These findings also complement those of Kolev et al. (2008) , who document a substitution effect between non-GAAP earnings exclusions and within-GAAP classification shifting on the income statement.
Our findings also have practical implications for both corporate boards and regulators as they consider introducing clawback provisions into firms' financial reporting environments. This point is especially relevant as the mandatory clawback provisions required by the Dodd-Frank Act are soon to take effect. While one cannot assume that the effects we observe on non-GAAP reporting will apply to all adopters, our findings do suggest that mandatory clawback adoption may result in a shift toward more opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings disclosure.
Regulators may need to consider more comprehensive ways to enhance overall financial reporting quality before proceeding with plans for mandatory adoption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background on clawback provisions, and Section 3 outlines our hypothesis development. Section 4 presents the sample selection procedure and descriptive statistics. In Section 5, we discuss the research design and the empirical results. We perform additional tests in Section 6 and conclude the paper in Section 7.
Background on Clawback Provisions
Clawback provisions allow a firm to recover incentive-based compensation from corporate executives upon the occurrence of some predefined event, typically an earnings restatement. We extend the literature on the consequences of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions by empirically examining the effect of clawbacks on the frequency and quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Upon first consideration, it is not obvious that clawback adoption would have any significant effect on non-GAAP reporting practices since non-GAAP earnings are subjectively defined, are not audited, and are not subject to restatement. Thus, reporting a non-GAAP earnings figure that selectively excludes certain expenses could not 3 A few studies examine the determinants of clawback adoption decision. Brown et al. (2013) find that the firm size, CEO duality, extraordinary M&A bonus, goodwill impairments, and accounting restatements are associated with clawback adoption decisions. Barbenko et al. (2013) find that prior executive misbehavior, governance structure, and executive compensations are related to adoption of a clawback provision.
trigger a clawback of executive compensation, however opportunistically the non-GAAP earnings figure might be defined by firm managers.
However, prior research has linked non-GAAP reporting to the relative informativeness of GAAP earnings, thus any improvement in GAAP earnings quality resulting from clawback adoption may have an indirect effect on the frequency and quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Alternatively, the very fact that non-GAAP disclosures are not subject to clawback provisions may affect the relative usefulness of non-GAAP disclosure as a tool to potentially mislead investors. We explore both of these possibilities in developing our hypotheses.
The Effect of Clawback Adoptions on the Frequency of Non-GAAP Disclosure
It is well-known that there are two competing incentives underlying the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. The first is that managers want to inform investors by providing them with a measure of core earnings that is likely to persist in the future. Managers therefore remove nonrecurring items from GAAP earnings to better communicate firm performance. Consistent with this motivation, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) and Bhattacharya et al. (2003) report that non-GAAP earnings are more value relevant than GAAP earnings. In addition, Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that the likelihood of non-GAAP earnings disclosure is inversely related to GAAP earnings quality and that investors view non-GAAP earnings as more useful when GAAP earnings informativeness is low. If managers are using non-GAAP earnings informatively and if clawback adoption improves GAAP reporting quality, as documented in the prior literature, then managers may feel less need to provide investors with an alternative measure of firm performance through non-GAAP disclosure. This line of reasoning suggests that voluntary adoption of clawback provisions may result in a decrease in the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosure.
An alternative motivation for releasing non-GAAP earnings is that managers use these disclosures opportunistically. For example, a number of studies report that non-GAAP earnings disclosures are used to meet or beat earnings benchmarks that cannot be reached via GAAP (see, e.g., Doyle et al. 2013; Black and Christensen 2009; Heflin and Hsu 2008) . Prior research has also documented that recurring expenses are often excluded from non-GAAP earnings to inflate perceptions of firms' recurring earnings (see Doyle et al. 2003; Black and Christensen 2009) .
Because clawbacks increase the managerial costs of misstating GAAP earnings, thereby reducing managerial perceptions of reporting discretion under GAAP, managers may be more likely to attempt to reach financial reporting goals through opportunistic disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. This scenario suggests that the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure will increase after voluntary clawback adoption.
However, voluntary adoption of clawbacks may signal the board's commitment to improving the financial reporting environment overall. Managers with opportunistic motives may be discouraged from using non-GAAP earnings due to an expectation of heightened monitoring by the boards following clawback adoption, resulting in a decrease in the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure.
A further possibility is that "altruistic" managers (i.e., those who use non-GAAP earnings to better inform investors) may use non-GAAP earnings more frequently to communicate core earnings to compensate for a perceived reduction in reporting discretion under GAAP after clawback adoption. This suggests that the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosure will increase after clawback adoption.
Finally, it is also possible that clawback adoption does not change managerial behavior regarding non-GAAP disclosure if the adoption of clawback provisions is merely a signal of a firm's existing reporting quality. The signaling theory suggests that firms with high reporting quality are more likely to voluntarily adopt clawback provisions to communicate their superior quality to stakeholders (Chan et al. 2012) . Firms with high reporting quality are less likely to be adversely affected by clawback adoption because managers in those firms are less likely to use non-GAAP earnings disclosures opportunistically. To the extent that firms with higher financial reporting quality voluntarily adopt clawback provisions as a credible signal, managers are unlikely to change their non-GAAP reporting patterns. In addition, since non-GAAP earnings are not subject to restatement, managers may have little incentive to change their non-GAAP reporting practicing after clawback adoption.
We therefore make no directional prediction with regard to changes in the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosure after a firm voluntarily adopts clawback provisions and present the first hypothesis in null form:
H1:
The voluntary adoption of clawback provisions has no effect on the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosure.
The Effect of Clawback Adoptions on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions
Prior literature on non-GAAP disclosure assesses the quality of non-GAAP earnings by investigating whether non-GAAP exclusions have implications for future performance (see Doyle et al. 2003) . Managers who disclose non-GAAP earnings to better inform investors are likely to exclude items only if those items are transitory, so that non-GAAP measures better reflect core earnings. If excluded items are transitory, they will have no predictive power for future performance; thus "high quality" non-GAAP exclusions are those that have no association with future performance. On the other hand, managers who attempt to mislead investors are more likely to exclude recurring items from non-GAAP earnings; thus "low quality" non-GAAP exclusions are those that have a significant association with future performance.
As However, clawback adoption may signal firms' commitment to carefully monitor all aspects of financial reporting, including non-GAAP disclosures, and prior research has shown that the quality of non-GAAP exclusions is positively correlated with the strength of corporate governance (see Frankel et al. 2011) . This suggests that managers may respond to an improvement in corporate governance structure by increasing the quality of non-GAAP exclusions after clawback adoption, regardless of their motivations for non-GAAP disclosure.
Therefore, the second hypothesis is presented in null form:
H2:
The voluntary adoption of clawback provisions has no effect on the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions.
Joint Interpretation of Hypothesis Test Results
While clawback adoption may affect the frequency or quality of non-GAAP reporting, it is necessary to view the results from both hypothesis tests collectively before drawing any inferences regarding the overall effect of clawbacks on non-GAAP reporting. There are four possible combinations of results: (1) both the frequency and quality of non-GAAP reporting increases; (2) frequency increases but quality decreases; (3) frequency decreases but quality increases; and (4) both frequency and quality decrease. 4 We interpret these four outcomes as follows:
Case 1. More frequent and higher quality non-GAAP disclosure is consistent with an increase in the 'altruistic' (or 'informative') use of non-GAAP reporting.
Case 2. More frequent but lower quality non-GAAP disclosure is consistent with an increase in the 'opportunistic' use of non-GAAP reporting.
Case 3. Less frequent but higher quality non-GAAP disclosure is consistent with a decrease in the 'opportunistic' use of non-GAAP reporting.
Case 4. Less frequent and lower quality non-GAAP disclosure is consistent with a decrease in the 'altruistic' (or 'informative') use of non-GAAP reporting.
These interpretations are summarized in Figure 1 .
Sample Selection Criteria and Data Description
Our basic empirical approach, which closely aligns with that of deHaan et al. (2012) and Chan et al. (2012) , is as follows. We match each clawback adopter to a non-adopting control firm using propensity score matching and then perform a difference-in-differences analysis to assess pre-versus post-adoption changes in non-GAAP reporting. The difference-in-differences design controls for both cross-sectional and temporal differences between our treatment and control firms, and propensity score matching helps us to further eliminate cross-sectional differences between the two groups, especially those that may affect or are correlated with the likelihood of clawback implementation or non-GAAP reporting.
To identify our treatment sample of clawback adopters, we follow Chan et al. (2012) and obtain clawback adoption data and other corporate governance characteristics from the Corporate Library, which covers firms in the Russell 3000 Index. We initially identify 297 non-regulated firms as having voluntarily adopted clawback provisions during our sample period from 2005 to 2009. We exclude financial firms from the sample because the majority of them mandatorily adopted clawback provisions under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008. 5 We then hand-collect more detailed information regarding firms' clawback provisions from their proxy statements filed with the SEC.
The source of non-GAAP earnings data warrants careful consideration. In contrast to the prior literature on non-GAAP reporting, which tends to employ either manager-adjusted non-GAAP earnings collected from firms' press releases (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2003, Lougee and Marquardt 2004) or I/B/E/S actual earnings as a proxy for non-GAAP earnings (e.g., Bradshaw
and Sloan 2002, Doyle et al. 2003 , Heflin and Hsu 2008 , Kolev et al. 2008 as their data source, our research design employs both measures. In our preliminary analysis, where we use propensity score matching to identify control firms for our sample of voluntary clawback adopters, we include I/B/E/S actual earnings as one of many potential determinants of clawback adoption. This design choice allows us to use the widest sample possible when searching for appropriate control firms. However, in our main tests of H1 and H2, we use manager-adjusted non-GAAP earnings information collected from firms' earnings announcements (as filed in Form 8-K with the SEC). This latter design choice is especially important, as it ensures that the non-GAAP disclosures we are examining are solely the result of managerial decision-making and are uncontaminated by analyst adjustments to reported earnings (e.g., Gu and Chen 2004) We obtain data for the propensity matching procedure and for our hypothesis tests from The numerous differences in the firm characteristics of clawback adopters versus nonadopters, documented above, illustrate why we undertake a propensity-matching approach to our analysis. A comparison of clawback adopters with the population of all non-adopting firms is unlikely to shed light on the question of whether clawback adoption impacts future non-GAAP reporting decisions. We therefore select a single control firm for each clawback adopter by matching each adopter to the non-adopting firm with the closest predicted value (i.e, "propensity score") from a logit model estimation of clawback adoption. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has adopted a clawback provision and zero otherwise (Claw) and each of the firm characteristics from Panel B of Table 1 are included as independent variables, as follows:
We estimate equation 1 Selected non-adopters (control firms) are assigned with "pseudo" adoption years. We require both clawback adopters and non-adopters to have at least one observation before and after the clawback adoption year so that we are able to use the difference-in-difference research design.
This procedure yields 247 pairs of voluntary clawback adopters and non-adopters (1:1 matching).
Panel A of Table 2 Descriptive data related to the success of the propensity matching procedure are presented in Panels B and C of Table 2 . In Panel B, we compare the means and medians of the independent variables in equation (1) for the clawback adopters and their matched controls. As shown in Panel B, there are no significant differences in the mean or median of any variable, which suggests that the treatment and control firms are well-matched on all of these dimensions.
Further, in Panel C we find that the mean (median) difference in propensity scores between the two groups is -0.002 (0.000) and standard deviation of the difference is 0.005, indicating that there is no significant difference between the propensity scores of the treatment firms and their matched controls. We conclude that the propensity-matching procedure has succeeded in identifying appropriate control firms for each clawback adopter.
Next, we hand-collect non-GAAP earnings data for this sample of 247 treatment-control matched firm pairs using either 8-K filings or press releases that appeared on the company's website. This process ensures that the non-GAAP disclosures we are examining are based on manager, rather than analyst, adjustments to GAAP earnings. As shown in Panel D of Table 2, we were able to obtain non-GAAP earnings from the 8-K or from a press release for 188 treatment-control pairs.
In Panel E, we compare the means and medians of the independent variables in equation
(1) for this smaller sample of clawback adopters and their matched controls. We again find no significant differences between the treatment and control firms. We use this sample, which relies on hand-collected non-GAAP earnings data from firms' 8-K's and press releases, in all of our subsequent analyses.
Research Design and Empirical Results

The Frequency of Non-GAAP Disclosure and Voluntary Clawback Adoption
To test H1, we estimate a probit model of the likelihood of disclosing non-GAAP earnings in a given quarter. We model the probability of releasing non-GAAP earnings as a function of clawback adoption and other determinants of non-GAAP disclosures that have been identified in prior literature, as follows:
The dependent variable, NonGAAP q , is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm discloses non-GAAP earnings in its earnings release for a given quarter and 0 otherwise. After is an indicator variable that equals 1 when clawback provisions (or pseudo-assigned clawback provisions for non-adopters) are in place and 0 otherwise. Claw is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is a voluntary adopter of clawback provisions and 0 otherwise. In Model 1, the test sample includes only clawback adopters, and our main variable of interest is After. In Model 2, which employs the difference-in-differences research design, the test sample includes both clawback adopters and their matched control firms, and our main variable of interest is After*Claw. Significant coefficients on these variables would provide evidence that clawback adoption significantly influences the likelihood of non-GAAP disclosure.
We include the following control variables in both models:
Ln(Total Assets) = natural log of total assets Intangibles = intangible assets divided by total assets Tech = an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999) ; Market to Book = share price/(common equity/outstanding shares);
Sales Growth = quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis Leverage = total liabilities divided by book value of stockholders' equity Earnings Volatility = standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters SI = an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm reports a special item in quarter q and 0 otherwise Bigbath = an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm reports a negative special items and negative earnings in the same quarter and 0 otherwise Special Items = a dollar amount of special items divided by total assets Loss = an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise QTR4 = an indicator variable equal to 1 for the 4th quarter and 0 otherwise Accrual = GAAP earnings less cash from operations divided by total assets
We include Ln(Total Assets) because large firms tend to disclose non-GAAP earnings more frequently, suggesting firm size is an important factor to control for systematic difference between clawback adopters and non-adopters. Firms with high intangibles or high-tech firms have less informative GAAP earnings, and therefore are more likely to release non-GAAP earnings than other firms (Lougee and Marquardt 2004) . As such, we include the amount of intangible assets (Intangibles) and a high-tech indicator variable (Tech). Since growth firms are more likely to report non-GAAP earnings, market-to-book ratio (Market to Book) and sales growth rate (Sales Growth) are included in the model (Lougee and Marquardt 2004) .
Leverage is included to control for the increased likelihood of earnings management with high leverage ratio, which may result in less informative GAAP earnings. Earnings Volatility is used as a control because investors tend to demand additional information when earnings are volatile (Defond and Hung 2003) . Firms reporting large special items are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings. Following Heflin and Hsu (2008) , we include two controls for special items: (1) SI, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm discloses special items in quarter q and 0 otherwise; and (2) Special Items, which is the reported dollar amount of special items divided by total assets. 8 Since firms that miss earnings benchmarks are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings, we include a loss indicator variable (Loss) that equals one when GAAP earnings before extraordinary items are negative and zero otherwise. In addition, a "big bath" indicator variable (Bigbath) is included because firms may be more likely to report non-GAAP earnings when it reports a one-time charge that results in an operating loss. Heflin and Hsu (2008) find that firms are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings in the fourth quarter than in other quarters. We therefore include QTR4, an indicator variable equal to 1 for all firmquarter observations that represent the firm's fourth fiscal quarter, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we follow Doyle et al. (2008) and include total accruals (Accrual) as a control variable. In addition,
we control for time trends in non-GAAP reporting by including year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The results from estimating Models 1 and 2 are presented in Table 3 . When we limit the sample to only clawback adopters, as in Model 1, we find that the likelihood of non-GAAP earnings disclosure is marginally significantly higher after clawback adoption -the estimated coefficient on After is 0.245 (p=0.10). These results indicate that managers are marginally significantly more likely to release non-GAAP earnings after voluntarily adopting clawback provisions than before. 9 However, the results are much stronger when we employ the differencein-differences method, as in Model 2. Here, the estimated coefficient on After*Claw is 0.505 and highly significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that managers are more likely to report non-GAAP 8 In addition to these measures, Heflin and Hsu (2008) include the magnitude of industry mean special items because it explains significant portion of probability of disclosing non-GAAP earnings. Our results are insensitive to the inclusion of this variable. 9 The marginal effect of voluntary clawback adoption in Model 1 is 0.096; i.e., the probability of releasing non-GAAP earnings is 9.6% higher after voluntarily adopting clawback adoptions than it was prior to clawback adoption.
earnings after voluntarily adopting clawback provisions, relative to non-adopters. We therefore reject the null hypothesis H1 and conclude that voluntary clawback adoption significantly increases the likelihood of non-GAAP earnings disclosure.
The estimated coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with our expectations. We find the expected positive association between Intangibles or Tech and the likelihood of non-GAAP disclosure, suggesting that firms with less informative earnings are significantly more likely to report non-GAAP earnings to communicate their performance, and
Leverage is significantly negatively associated with the probability of non-GAAP disclosure.
Earnings Volatility is positively associated with the probability of non-GAAP disclosure in Model 1 and 2 (2.097 and 5.002, respectively), consistent with the view that higher GAAP earnings volatility creates investor demand for additional information to understand fundamental performance. As expected, when firms disclose special items (SI) they are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings. Special Items is also significantly negatively associated with the probability of non-GAAP disclosure, indicating that managers are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings as the magnitude of income-decreasing special items becomes larger.
In sum, our analysis of non-GAAP disclosure frequency reveals that firms utilize non-GAAP earnings more frequently after the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions. The increases in the frequency of non-GAAP disclosures may be either due to the perceived reduction in GAAP reporting discretion following voluntary clawback adoptions or due to an improvement in GAAP financial reporting quality, depending on whether the underlying managerial motives are to inform or mislead investors. Therefore, we further test the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions after voluntary clawback adoption.
The Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions and Voluntary Clawback Adoption
To test H2, we follow prior research and define higher quality non-GAAP exclusions as being more transitory and having no predictive power for future operating income (Doyle et al. 2003; Kolev et al. 2008) . As in our tests of H1, we use both the sample of only clawback adopters and the sample of matched treatment-control pairs to test H2. We employ the following regression models: Sales Growth = quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis Market to book = price/(common equity/outstanding shares) Ln(Total Assets) = a natural log of total assets in millions and corresponds to quarter q Earnings Volatility = standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters Loss = an indicator variable equal to 1 if quarterly earnings before extraordinary items is less than 0 and 0 otherwise Ln(Age) = natural log of the number of years since a company first appeared in Compustat Accrual = GAAP earnings less cash flow from operations divided by total assets Following Kolev et al. (2008) , we use future operating income (FutureOperatingIncome), defined as earnings per share from operations summed over the four quarters beginning with quarter q+1, as the dependent variable for the test of exclusion quality. One advantage of using future EPS from operations as a dependent variable is that Compustat excludes nonrecurring special items but includes recurring items which may be classified as other exclusions from non-GAAP earnings (Kolev et al. 2008 ).
As noted earlier, non-GAAP earnings (NonGAAPEarnings) are hand-collected from press releases in the 8-K filings furnished by the SEC, and non-GAAP exclusions (NonGAAPExclusions) are defined as non-GAAP earnings less comparable GAAP earnings disclosed with non-GAAP earnings in the press releases. Claw and After are as defined in To control for potential confounding factors affecting future operating income and non-GAAP earnings, we include following control variables. Doyle et al. (2003) argue that growing firms tend to have lower future operating cash flows because of long-term investment and increase in the working capital and finds negative association between sales growth rate and future performance. In addition, prior empirical works find that market to book ratio is positively correlated to future earnings and non-GAAP reporting decisions. Therefore, we include two proxies for sales growth: (1) sales growth rate (Sales Growth) and (2) Market-to-book ratio (Market to book). Firm size (Ln(Total Assets)) is included because the costs of opportunistic non-GAAP reporting may increase with firm size. Firms with less persistent earnings could be perceived as lower quality of earnings, creating a demand for additional information (Lougee and Marquardt 2004) . Therefore, we include Earnings Volatility and Loss to control for this effect.
We include Ln(Age) to consider potential effects of firm age on non-GAAP exclusions and future earnings. Finally, total accruals (Accrual) are included in the model to control for any effects of accrual reversal on future earnings, which may affect the association between non-GAAP exclusions and future earnings. (2003) and Kolev et al (2008) , the coefficients on NonGAAPExclusion in Models 3 and 4, are significantly negatively (-0.216, and -0.244, respectively) , suggesting that the excluded items are not transitory but likely to recur within the next four quarters.
If voluntary clawback adoption encourages altruistically motivated managers to disclose non-GAAP earnings more frequently, the exclusions should be more transitory, suggesting that the relation between the exclusions and future operating income is less negative after clawback adoptions. On the other hand, if voluntary clawback adoption motivates opportunistically motivated managers to disclose non-GAAP earnings more frequently, non-GAAP exclusions should be less transitory, suggesting that the relation is more negative after clawback adoption.
In Model 3, the coefficient on After*NonGAAPExclusion is significantly negative (-0.410), indicating that exclusions become less transitory after voluntary clawback adoption than before it. This suggests that managers use non-GAAP earnings more opportunistically after clawback provisions are in place, consistent with the view that clawback provisions impose significant costs on managing GAAP earnings and that managers switch their focus toward non-GAAP earnings as an earnings management tool after the adoption. Model 4 presents results using the propensity-score matched sample. The coefficient on the main variable of interest, , is significantly negative (-0.485), again suggesting that the exclusion becomes less transitory, i.e., clawback adopters opportunistically use non-GAAP earnings.
The signs of coefficients on control variables are generally consistent with prior literature.
SalesGrowth, firm size (Ln(Total Assets), and firm age are all significantly positively related to future operating income, which suggests that large, mature firms with good growth opportunities tend to have better future performance. Earnings Volatility is negatively related to future operating income, suggesting that firms with less persistent earnings tend to report lower future earnings. Finally, total accruals (Accrual) are associated with lower future operating income, consistent with the reversal of accruals.
Taking the results from the frequency (H1) and quality (H2) tests together, our evidence indicates that the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure increases and the quality of non-GAAP exclusions deteriorates after the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions. This is consistent with Case (2) of Figure 1 -i.e., an increase in opportunistic non-GAAP reporting following voluntary clawback adoption --and is not an intended consequence of clawback adoption. While prior research has shown that financial reporting benefits follow clawback adoption (deHaan et al. 2012; Chan et al. 2012) , to our knowledge this is the first evidence to document that any costs are significantly associated with clawback adoption.
Given the potential importance of these findings, we perform additional analyses in the next two subsections to confirm that voluntary clawback adoption leads to an increase in opportunistic reporting of non-GAAP earnings.
The Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions and Net Operating Assets
To confirm our interpretation of increased opportunistic reporting of non-GAAP earnings following clawback adoption, we build on the work of Barton and Simko (2002) , who argue that high levels of NOA partly reflect the extent of previous earnings management and constrain managers' ability to further optimistically bias reported earnings. Consistent with this argument, Doyle et al. (2013) find that managers are more likely to use non-GAAP earnings to meet analyst forecasts when NOA is high. If voluntary clawback adoption results in an increase in the opportunistic use of non-GAAP disclosure, we expect the decrease in the quality of non-GAAP exclusions following clawback adoption to be more (less) pronounced for clawback adopters with high (low) NOA.
To test this supposition, we dichotomize the sample of clawback adopters by the median level of beginning net operating assets (NOA) on their balance sheet and repeat the analysis from Table 4 . As shown in Table 5 , the estimated coefficient on the main variable of interest, After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion, is significantly negative only for the High NOA column. The estimated coefficient is -0.636 and significant at the 0.05 level for the High NOA subsample, while the estimated coefficient of -0.154 for the Low NOA subsample is not significantly different from zero. In other words, managers tend to exclude more recurring items from non-GAAP earnings when their ability to manage GAAP earnings is constrained by both a clawback provision and high levels of NOA, consistent with opportunistic reporting choices.
The Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions and Meeting or Beating Analyst Forecasts
To further confirm that opportunistic non-GAAP reporting increases after voluntary clawback adoption, we build on Doyle et al. (2013) , who find that managers opportunistically define non-GAAP earnings in order to meet or beat analyst expectations. If clawback adoption leads to an increase in opportunistic non-GAAP reporting, we expect the decrease in the quality of non-GAAP exclusions following clawback adoption to be more (less) pronounced for clawback adopters that miss (meet or beat) analyst consensus forecasts.
To test for this effect, we dichotomize the sample of clawback adopters into cases where quarterly GAAP earnings missed the most recent analyst consensus forecast and cases where quarterly GAAP earnings would meet or beat the forecast and repeat our analysis from Table 4 .
As shown in Table 5 , the estimated coefficient of -0.409 on the main variable of interest, After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion, is marginally significantly negative for the subsample where GAAP earnings missed analyst forecasts. In contrast, the estimated coefficient of -0.838 is not significantly different from zero. This suggests that clawback adopters exclude more recurring items from non-GAAP earnings when GAAP earnings misses the consensus forecast, which is consistent with opportunistic reporting.
Sensitivity Tests
The Effect of Types of Clawback Provisions on Non-GAAP Earnings
We conduct an additional test examining the effect of different types of clawback provisions on the frequency and quality of non-GAAP exclusions. There are three conditions which trigger clawback provisions: (1) fraudulent activities or misconducts resulting in accounting restatements (fraud-based provision), (2) inaccurate numbers or errors upon which calculations of incentive compensation were based and consequently are subject to an accounting restatement (performance-based provision), and (3) activities which are detrimental to the firms during a certain period of time after the termination of employment, or through some other violation of a non-compete agreement (non-compete provision). Since a perceived reporting discretion is not associated with non-compete clawback provisions, firms adopting non-compete clawback provisions do not affect firms' GAAP reporting discretion. However, fraud-based and performance-based clawback provisions subsequently resulting in accounting restatements require a firm to claw back incentive compensation which was paid to executives, suggesting that fraud-and performance-based clawback provisions are likely to reduce the perceived GAAP reporting discretion. Therefore, we expect that the frequency and quality of non-GAAP disclosure is related to clawback adoption only when the restatement is required to claw back executive compensations.
We therefore separate the sample into two groups: clawback adopters with fraud-based or performance-based clawback provisions and clawback adopters with only non-compete provisions. In untabulated analysis, we find a significantly increase in the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure only in the sample consisting of firms adopting fraud-or performance-based clawback provisions, and an insignificant coefficient in a sample consisting of firms with noncompete clawback provisions. We find similar results in the exclusion quality tests. That is, we find a significant decrease in exclusion quality only in the sample consisting of firms adopting fraud-or performance-based clawback provisions, and we find no evidence of a relationship between voluntary clawback adoption and the quality of non-GAAP exclusions in a sample consisting of firms with non-compete clawback provisions. These results corroborate the conclusion that a perceived reduction in GAAP reporting discretion increases managerial focus on non-GAAP earnings in response to the increased cost of managing GAAP earnings after the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions.
The Assumption of the Quarter When Adoption of Clawback Provision Occurs
In testing H1 and H2, we assume that clawback adoption occurs in the first quarter of the adoption year because the exact date upon which each firm adopts clawback provision is not disclosed. It can, therefore, be argued that the quarter in which the clawback adoption occurs systematically varies across firms. One possible solution for this problem is to identify the exact date of clawback adoption from the proxy statements; however, this would require handcollecting the annual shareholder meeting dates from proxy statements. We attempt to address this issue by assuming that the adoption decision randomly occurs throughout the year for a given company. Then we perform the same tests using these randomly assigned quarters as the quarter in which adoption occurs, rather than assuming that clawback provisions are adopted from the first quarter of the year for all firms. The untabulated results from this analysis are qualitatively similar to our main results. 
Conclusions
The primary objective of compensation recovery provisions, or clawbacks, is to prevent managers from issuing misstated financial numbers in anticipation of higher compensation.
Under Section 304 of SOX, the SEC is authorized to recover bonus and incentive-based compensation received by CEOs and CFOs of companies if the companies restate financial statements due to misconduct, and Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act also includes provisions on the recovery of compensation given to executive officers based on erroneously reported information in a prior period. Voluntary adoption of clawback provisions has also gained in popularity among public companies.
Consistent with the objective of clawback provisions, the extant literature documents that voluntary adoption of clawback provisions improves financial reporting quality. Investors find earnings more informative after clawback adoption. This practice may, however, make GAAP earnings more costly for managers to misstate. We argue that an increase in the costs of misstating GAAP earnings is likely to change a manager's non-GAAP reporting behavior because of the relatively lower costs for misstating non-GAAP earnings after clawback adoption.
We find that managers release non-GAAP earnings more frequently after the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions. In addition, the quality of non-GAAP exclusions deteriorates after these provisions are adopted. These findings are consistent with an increase in opportunistic non-GAAP reporting after clawback adoption, suggesting that an increase in the cost of manipulating GAAP earnings relative to non-GAAP earnings can cause opportunisticallymotivated managers to shift their focus from GAAP to non-GAAP earnings. Additional crosssectional tests on the quality of non-GAAP exclusions corroborate our findings.
This paper contributes to current literature on voluntary clawback adoption by documenting that the improvement in financial reporting quality prescribed by GAAP is achieved at the expense of opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings. It also contributes to the literature on non-GAAP earnings by documenting that non-GAAP earnings are a substitute for GAAP earnings in the opportunistic use of earnings metrics when firms are faced with stricter monitoring environments.
FIGURE 1 Interpretation of Hypothesis Test Results
H2: QUALITY of non-GAAP disclosure
Increase ( ([data#2 q -data#2 q-4 ] / data#15); Leverage: total liabilities divided by book value of stockholders' equity; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of ROA over past 8 quarters; Loss: an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is negative and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book: price/(common equity/outstanding shares); SI: an indicator variable that equals one if firm reports a special item in quarter q and zero otherwise; Special Items: the amount of reported special items divided by total assets; Leverage: Total liabilities divided by book value of stockholders' equity; Ln(Age): natural log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat; Accrual: GAAP earnings less cash from operations divided by total assets; Restatement: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm restates its financial statement within prior two years and 0 otherwise; Restate_error: an indicator variable that accounting restatement is due to clerical errors, and 0 otherwise; Tech: an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999) , and 0 otherwise; Big4: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a company hires a Big 4 auditor and 0 otherwise; %Outside: the percentage of outside directors on board; %Insider: the percentage of insiders' shareholding; NonGAAPEarnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings per share; Non-GAAP equals 1 if a NonGAAPEarnings does not equal GAAPEarnings and zero otherwise. NonGAAPExclusions: Non-GAAP Earnings -GAAP Earnings. All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching Results
NonGAAP equals 1 if a firm discloses non-GAAP in the quarter and 0 otherwise; : an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is voluntary clawback adopters and 0 otherwise ; After: an indicator variable that equals one if the period q is after the clawback adoption among clawback adopters and 0 otherwise; Ln(Total Assets): a natural log of total assets; Intangibles: Intangible assets divided by total assets; Tech: an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999) ; Market-to-book: price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis ([data#2q -data#2q-4] / data#15); Leverage: Total liabilities divided by book value of stockholders' equity; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of ROA over past 8 quarters; SI: an indicator variable that equals one if firm reports a special item in quarter q and zero otherwise; Special Items: the amount of reported special items; Bigbath: one if if a firm reports a negative special items and negative earnings in the same quarter; QTR4: an indicator variable for each quarter; Accruals: GAAP earnings less cash from operations; All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
FutureOperatingIncome: Earnings per Share from operations which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1; : an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a voluntary clawback adopter and 0 otherwise; After: an indicator variable that equals one if the period q is after the voluntary clawback adoption and 0 otherwise; GAAP Earnings: basic EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (data#19); NonGAAPEarnings: Non-GAAP earnings per share, as disclosed in firms' quarterly earnings release; NonGAAPExclusions: NonGAAP Earnings -GAAP Earnings; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis ([data#2q -data#2q-4] / data#15); Ln(Total Assets): a natural log of data#44in millions and corresponds to quarter q; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of return on assets (data#25 / data#44) over at least six of the previous eight quarters; Loss: an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book: price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Age): a natural log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat; Accruals: GAAP earnings less cash from operations; All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
FutureOperatingIncome: Earnings per Share from operation which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1; : an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a voluntary clawback adopter and 0 otherwise; After: an indicator variable that equals one if the period q is after the voluntary clawback adoption and 0 otherwise; GAAP Earnings: basic EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (data#19); NonGAAPEarnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings per share; NonGAAPExclusions: Non-GAAP Earnings -GAAP Earnings; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis ([data#2q -data#2q-4] / data#15); Ln(Total Assets): a natural log of data#44in millions and corresponds to quarter q; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of return on assets (data#25 / data#44) over at least six of the previous eight quarters; Negative Surprise: an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter (data#25) is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book: price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Age): a natural log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat; Accruals: GAAP earnings less cash from operations. All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
FutureOperatingIncome: Earnings per Share from operation which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1; : an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a voluntary clawback adopter and 0 otherwise ; After: an indicator variable that equals one if the period q is after the voluntary clawback adoption and 0 otherwise; GAAP Earnings: basicEPS before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (data#19); NonGAAPEarnings:I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings per share; NonGAAPExclusions:Non-GAAP Earnings -GAAP Earnings; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis ([data#2q -data#2q-4] / data#15); Ln(Total Assets): a natural log of data#44in millions and corresponds to quarter q; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of return on assets (data#25 / data#44) over at least six of the previous eight quarters; Negative Surprise:an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter (data#25) is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book: price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Age): a natural log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat; Accruals: GAAP earnings less cash from operations; All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
